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(Retrenchment might parallel a similar Bush administration move toward re
and
bilateral trade policy, where avoiding multilateral negotiations facilitates the
gional
exercise of relative U.S. power in securing deeper trade integration and the leverage
to secure better terms of trade in nonweapons-sensitive market sectors.) I raise these

we be?

questions about the continued utility of existing multilateral regimes in the spirit of
Lord Keynes, who also said, "Words ought to be a litde wild, for they are the assault of
were ever any doubt, the death of more than
thoughts on the unthinking."9 If there
three thousand American and foreign nationals on September 11th now clearly estab
lishes the need to think through arms control and nonproliferation policy from the
ground up, so that law follows good policy and the shackles of international law do not
prevent us from getting things right.
Let us now look at the real world gains in international security to be achieved in arms
control and nonproliferation policies as we grapple with these larger questions of legal
strategy.Department of Defense Associate Deputy General Counsel Jack Beard will now
to address the threat of chemi
cal and biological weapons proliferation, particularly in the soft underbelly of Russia,
the region of greatest strategic interest today.

address the bilateral efforts of the Bush administration

Recent
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byJackM. Beard*
The threat of biological weapons, once an obscure topic tomost Americans, achieved
new prominence and urgency in the United States with the anthrax letter attacks that
followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 200L A number of infections traced to
a handful of anthrax-laced letters focused
attention inAmerica on the
unprecedented

(BW). Coupled with continuing reports of attempts by
danger of biological weapons
terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction, this has made efforts to prevent BW
proliferation a high priority for the U.S. government.
Notwithstanding the new prominence of the BW threat, theU.S. government recendy
withdrew its support of a seven-year effort to create a new protocol to improve moni
(BWC).1 Con
toring and inspections under the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
cerned that the protocol's approach would compromise sensitive biological defense and
confidential business information and would do nothing to increase compliance with
the BWC, U.S. Under Secretary of State forArms Control and International Security
Convention
that "the
John Bolton, told a UN Conference on the Biological Weapons
United States will simply not enter into agreements that allow rogue states or others to
develop and deploy biological weapons,"
stating that the draft biological weapons
our
not
in
to
"is
dead
view
The United States also sought
be
and
resurrected."2
protocol
9
BARTLETT, supra note 1, at 783.
"
Associate Deputy General Counsel
of Defense; Adjunct Prof
(International Affairs), U.S. Department
essor of Law,
University Law Center; Professorial Lecturer in International Law and Institutions,
Georgetown
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. The views presented are
those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
of Defense or the U.S.
Department

government.
1
on the Prohibition of the
Convention
Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Bio
Development,
and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10,1972,26 UST 583,1015 UNTS
163 (entered
logical) and Toxin Weapons
into force March 26,1975)
[hereinafter BWC]
(there are currendy 144 states that are parties to the BWC).
2
U.S. Names Five
press
int'l, Nov. 19, 2001; Steven
John Zarocostas,
Biological Weapons States, united
Mufson, U.S. Says Iraq, Others Pursue Germ Warfare, Wash.
post, Nov. 20, 2001, at A8 (noting thatMr. Bolton
also said that "the time for 'better than
isover" and that "we will continue to reject flawed
nothing' protocols
texts like the BWC draft protocol,
to us simply because
recommended
they are the product of lengthy
or
if such texts are not in the best interests of the United States" ).
negotiations
arbitrary deadlines,
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to focus attention on the number of BWC member countries with offensive BW pro
grams. In response, domestic and foreign commentators strongly cridcized the U.S.
position, questioning America's commitment to this and other multilateral efforts.3
Although theUnited States rejected the proposed BWC protocol, itcontinues to com

bat the threat posed by biological weapons by other means, including increased bilateral
efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. In a recent meeting with the
president ofRussia, President Bush declared that "our highest priority is to keep terrorists
from acquiring weapons of mass destruction" and that Mwewill strengthen our efforts
to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, materials,

and expertise."4 In this regard, there isno greater threat than that posed by the legacy
facilities
of the Soviet Union's BW program. In addition to fivemilitary microbiological
the
under the control of
Soviet Ministry of Defense, ithas been reported that as many
as forty-seven other scientific institutes and production facilities worked on biological
weapons under the cover of numerous other Soviet ministries and organizations. Many

of these only recently came to light after Russian President Boris Yeltsin officially ac
knowledged the existence of an offensive BW program inApril 1992.5
The legacy of the Soviet BW Program, coupled with economic problems in the states

(FSU), has posed a serious threat of proliferation of BW
related expertise (the "brain drain" of formerweapons scientists); smuggling or unauth
orized transitof pathogenic agents; and export and diversion of BW-related equipment,
including dual-use technology.6While many ofthe Soviet BW complexes and production
centers were located inRussia, two other former Soviet states, Kazakhstan and Uzbeki
stan, also have inherited substantial portions of this deadly BW infrastructure.The Scien
tificExperimental and Production Base at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan has been called by
of the former Soviet Union

experts the Soviet Union's main facility for themanufacture of biological weapons and
was in fact "one of the largest installations ever created for this purpose."7 It was at
the Soviet Union's most deadly weapons
Stepnogorsk that research teams developed
in
Other
facilities
Kazakhstan, such as the Scientific Research
grade anthrax agents.
to livestock and plants.8 On an isolated
harmful
Agricultural Institute, developed agents
in theAral Sea, the government ofUzbekistan isnow con
island named Vozrozhdeniye
fronted with the vast infrastructure that supported the Soviet Union's major open-air
BW testing range.9 In addition to being the site for testing pathogens such as tularemia,
is also theworld's largest
Q^ever, brucellosis, glanders and the plague, Vozrozhdeniye
anthrax burial ground.10

3
Bush Administration Irresponsible inFace ofBioweapons Threat: U.S. Kills Biological Weapons Conf, Puts U.S.
that European
at Risk, U.S. Newswire,
Dec. 7, 2001 (noting that the U.S. position "so shocked delegates"
as "liars"); Herve Kempf, Is US Power a Force for Good
referred to the U.S. delegation
Union
representatives
actions such as the
in theWorld? manchester
Guardian
Wkly., Jan. 23, 2002, at 29 (arguing that U.S.
a
uni
to the biological weapons
"the Americans
have adopted
that
show
deliberately
protocol
opposition
lateral stance").
4
with President Vladimir Putin of Russia,
President's News Conference
vol. 37, No. 46, Nov. 19, 2001, at 1.
B. Tucker, Bioweaponsfrom Russia: Stemming theFlow, issuesin
Jonathan
at 1-2, available at <http://www.nap.edu/issues>.

Public

Papers

sci.&tech.

ofthe

Online,

Presidents,
Spring

1999,

6/rf.atl.
7
et al., Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities inKazakhstan: Past, Present, Future,
Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva
BW
Paper No. I,at8
in 8 Occasional
1999).The
Stud.June
(Monterey Inst., Center for Nonproliferation
were
of 25 buildings;
consisted
two
kilometers
and
facilities at Stepnogorsk
they
capable
square
occupied
anthrax over a 10-month period.
of producing
up to 300 metric tons of weapons-grade
8
Id. at 11.
9
infra
own parts of Vozrozhdeniye
and Uzbekistan
both Kazakhstan
Island, the BW-related
Although
structure and testing range is located on the Uzbekistan
portion of the island.
10
a Special Report; At Bleak Asian Site, Killer Germs Survive, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
Judith Miller, Poison Island:
an
1999, at Al. In the spring of 1988, Soviet scientists secredy transferred hundreds of tons of militarized
into huge pits and
in giant steel canisters toVozrozhdeniye
thrax bacteria
Island, where they were dumped
only partially destroyed.
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U.S. government agencies are actively working to prevent the proliferation of BW
related expertise inRussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan through a variety ofmechanisms.
For example, the Department of State has direct responsibility for several nonprolif
eration programs in these countries, helping establish or strengthen export control
systems, providing better nonproliferation tools for export licensing and tracking, and
overseeing U.S. participation in the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
inRussia.11 The ISTC supports such activities as research projects that provide "incen

tives forweapons scientists to refrain from cooperating with terrorist groups or states"
and redirects them to "sustainable careers in peaceful, transparent civilian endeavors."12
With numerous countries reportedly seeking former Soviet weapons scientists to further
their own BW programs,13 these efforts to prevent the proliferation of BW-related ex
pertise enjoy substantial U.S. government support.
The Department of Defense (DoD), through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program, isparticularly active inwhat theDoD refers to as "Biological Weapons Prolif

(BWPP) projects. These BWPP projects help FSU states dismande
former Soviet BW research and production facilities; consolidate, secure, and eliminate
pathogenic stocks; and conduct targeted collaborative research with FSU scientists. As
a DoD official stated in testimony before
Congress, "in our view, the Biological Weapons
eration Prevention"

Proliferation Prevention aspect of the CTR program is of exceptional,

and increasing,

importance."14

Under the auspices of the ISTC, the DoD
is collaborating on research projects at
numerous Russian facilities and is also active in projects that improve the
physical
ISTC projects
security of dangerous pathogens and biological materials. Additional
designed by theDoD to support BWPP objectives are planned. Besides sponsoring ISTC

isworking closely with counterpart agencies on BWPP
projects in Russia, the DoD
activities inKazakhstan under an agreement concerning weapons of mass destruction

infrastructure elimination (WMDIE Agreement).15 These efforts include assistance in
dismantling and demilitarizing BW facilities at Stepnogorsk, enhancing biological safety
and security, and dismanding excess equipment and infrastructure at theAnti-Plague
Institute inAlmaty and the Scientific Research Agriculture Institute inOtar. Some of
this assistance is provided under an annex to theWMDIE Agreement
that is a frame

work

for assistance

related

to

"biological

material

protection,

control,

and

accountabil

and to
ity to conserve, characterize and protect strain collections of microorganisms
the
that
of
to
material
could
contribute
the
prevent
proliferation
biological
prolifera
tion of weapons of mass destruction."16
11
of Vann Van Diepen,
Testimony
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation,
Hearing
Before the International Security, Proliferation
and Federal Services Subcommittee
of the Senate Govern
on the
mental Affairs Committee
Assistance Coordination Act, federal news Service, Nov.
Nonproliferation
the European
29, 2001. The ISTC, which began itswork in 1994, is funded by private companies,
Union, and
the governments
of Japan, Norway, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. A similar institution, the
Science and Technology
Center
in Ukraine, began itswork in 1995.
12
Id.
"Judith Miller, The Germ Warriors: A Special Report; Iranians, Bioweapons inMind, Lure Needy Ex-Soviet Scien
tists,N.Y. Times, Dec. 8,1998, at Al.
14
Prepared
testimony of Marshall Billingslea, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Hearing Before the
on Governmental
Senate Committee
on International
Affairs Subcommittee
and
Security, Proliferation
Federal Services on the Nonproliferation
Assistance Coordination
Act, federal News service, Nov. 29,2001.
15
Between
the Department
of Defense
of the United States of America
and the Ministry of
Agreement
the Elimination
of Infrastructure for
Energy, Industry, and Trade of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning
ofMass Destruction, Oct. 3,1995, U.S.-Kaz., as amended
Weapons
June 10,1996, Sept. 9,1998, Dec. 17,1999,
and July 29, 2000 (on file with author)
The WMDIE
[hereinafter WMDIE
Agreement].
imple
Agreement
ments an "umbrella" agreement, The
the Destruction of Silo Launchers of Interconti
Agreement Concerning
nental Ballistic Missiles, Emergency Response,
and the Prevention of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Dec.
1993 WL 642422, extended Dec. 5,2000
is the executive
13,1993, U.S.-Kaz.,
(on file with author). The DoD
agent for the United States for activities under the umbrella agreement.
16
WMDIE
Agreement,
supra note 15, at Annex A, Art. I, para. 1 (on file with author).
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It is inUzbekistan, however, that the DoD has made perhaps themost notable prog
ress since September 11th. After years of analysis and preliminary talks, but within
just
weeks of the September terroristattacks on theUnited States, theDoD and theUzbeki
stan Ministry of Defense signed an agreement to dismande and demilitarize the BW
Island and to help Uzbekistan prevent proliferation
infrastructure on Vozrozhdeniye
of BW technology and dangerous pathogens.17 This agreement was viewed as particu
some of the anthrax buried at
was a
larlytimely in light of the fact that
Vozrozhdeniye
to
common
most
antibi
virulent
strain
with
thick
resistant
highly
protective capsules
otics, qualities thatmade itan ideal target for theftby terrorists: "Federal officials feared
terrorists from neighboring Afghanistan might be able to obtain viable
that al Qaeda
anthrax spores from the soil of the island . . .avoiding some of the technical hurdles
strain of anthrax."18 Administration officials noted
involved indeveloping a weaponized
that this agreement and a number of other U.S. government efforts together "reflect
President Bush's determination to bolster the nation's biological warfare defenses in
the wake of a spate of letters containing anthrax spores."19 Other commentators noted
that although the focus in times of crisis tends to be on havoc and fear, the agreement
with Uzbekistan could be viewed as a "collateral benefit."20 Moving quickly to begin dis
the BW infrastructure and eliminate pathogens at Vozrozhdeniye,
the DoD
manding
is now hoping to expand
Thus, while the United

the BWPP program to Georgia and Ukraine.
States has been criticized for rejecting the draft BWC proto
col, the events of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax letter attacks in theUnited
the U.S. government
States have focused more attention on other effective measures
isundertaking, including increased bilateral efforts to dismande the BW legacy of the

former Soviet Union. These accelerated efforts,which include assistance indismanding
and demilitarizing former production and research facilities, programs to consolidate,
control and secure dangerous pathogens, and collaborative research to prevent the
are part of a growing, proactive, and targeted
proliferation of BW-related expertise,
bilateral BW nonproliferation strategy. This proactive bilateral strategy,which is only
part of theU.S. government's efforts in this area, contrasts with the difficulties and frus
trations experienced by the United States in its efforts to promote implementation of
effective multilateral measures to counter the threat posed by biological weapons.
17
the Department
of Defense of the United States and the Ministry of Defense ofthe
Agreement Between
in the Area of Demilitarization
of Biological Weapons
of Uzbekistan
Concerning
Cooperation
Republic
Oct. 22, 2001,
Facilities and the Prevention of Proliferation of Biological Weapons
Associated
Technology,
the umbrella Agreement
2001 UST Lexis 57. This agreement
U.S.-Uzb.,
Cooper
Concerning
implements
ofWeapons
of
ation in theArea of the Promotion of Defense Relations and the Prevention of Proliferation
The
DoD
is
the
executive agent for the
UST Lexis 32.
Mass Destruction, June 5, 2001, U.S.-Uzb.,
2001,2001
United States for activities under the umbrella agreement, which was the first agreement
signed by Colin
Powell as secretary of state.
18
toRegulate The Trade in Toxins, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at A23.
Jonathan B. Tucker, How
A Nation Challenged: Spores; U.S. Agrees toClean Up Anthrax Site inUzbekistan, N.Y. times, Oct
Miller,
,9Judith
23, 2001, at Bl.
20
A Nation Challenged: An Overview: Oct. 21; More Deaths, More Questions, More Bombs,
Serge Schmemann,
at Bl.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 23,2001,

